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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUB PaoCEss-ENFoaCED CoLLECTION OF STATB 
UsB TAX FROM NoNREsmBNT VENDOR-Appellant is a Delaware corporation 
engaging in the retail furniture business in Delaware. It has no place of busi• 
ness in Maryland, nor does it solicit orders in that state. It does not accept mail 
or phone orders from Maryland, nor does it advertise in any Maryland publica· 
tions. The only contacts which the appellant has with Maryland customers, 
aside from direct dealings at appellant's retail store, are occasional direct mail 
advertisements, which it sends to all of its customers wherever located, and 
deliveries of goods purchased by Maryland customers. These deliveries are either 
made by commercial carrier or by appellant's own truck. On one of its delivery 
runs into Maryland this truck was seized by Maryland authorities and held for 
satisfaction of a tax claim asserted against appellant by that state. The tax 
claim was based on the Maryland use tax, 1 which provides that a vendor en· 
gaging in business in the state must collect the tax from its customers and remit 
it to the state or be personally liable. Appellant alleged that imposition of this 
tax and seizure of its truck were unconstitutional, but the Maryland Supreme 
Court held it liable for the tax.2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 
States held, imposition on appellant of liability for the tax was contrary to the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller Brothers Company 
11. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 74 S.Ct. 535 (1954). 
Two generally recognized rules concerning the power of a state to tax are 
that it may tax property and persons subject to its sovereignt:y3 and that it may 
1 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §368 et seq. 
2Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, (Md. 1953) 95 A. (2d) 286. 
s McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 at 429 (1819); Curry v. Mc• 
Candless, 307 U.S. 357 at 366, 59 S.Ct. 900 (1939). 
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not directly tax interstate commerce.4 A tax on the privilege of making a retail 
sale within the state may therefore be levied, 5 as may a tax properly placed on 
the use of property within the state.6 Serious problems arise, however, when a 
sale transaction is made partially within a state and partially without. One 
problem is whether the state of the purchaser may tax the sale of goods coming 
into it by way of interstate commerce.7 Another problem, relating to the impo• 
sition of a use tax, arises because most use tax statutes contain provisions making 
the vendor responsible for collecting the tax and remitting it to the state in 
which the property sold is 'to be used.8 The use tax is complementary to the 
sales tax and is designed primarily for the purpose of protecting local merchants 
from the competition of merchants doing business in states having no sales 
tax. 9 In theory, the tax is placed on the purchaser and is therefore a form 
of property tax. In practice, the ultimate burden is placed on the vendor, 
and various penalties against him are established in order to enforce this 
liability.10 If we are to look at the "incidence of the tax and its practical op-
eration" as the Court has said we must in determining the constitutionality 
of a state tax, 11 it would seem that the, use tax is really a tax on the vendor 
and that, in order to justify it, sovereignty of the state over the vendor and 
the sale transaction must be established. Depending on the result which it 
apparently sought to reach, the Supreme Court on different occasions has said 
that use taxes and sales taxes are the same or dissimilar.12 Most of the dis-
tinctions made are without substance, however. In attempting to draw the 
line within which the taxing jurisdiction of the purchaser's state is valid and 
beyond which it is void, the Court has employed and discarded a variety of 
criteria, subjecting itself to some caustic comment en route.13 In various de-
4 Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U.S. 489, 7 S.Ct. 592 (1887); Gwin, White & 
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S.Ct. 325 (1939); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. 
Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 58 S.Ct. 913 (1938). 
5 Woodru£E v. Parham, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 123 (1868); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 
622, 5 S.Ct. 1091 (1885); New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 27 S.Ct. 
188 (1907). 
6 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 57 S.Ct. 524 (1937); Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S.Ct. 389 (1939); Pacific Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182, 59 S.Ct. 396 (1939). 
7 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388 (1940); 
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct. 1023 (1944). . 
8 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §371. 
9 Criz, ''The Use Tax: History, Administration, and Economic Effects," 78 PuB. 
ADM. SERV. 1 at 2 (1941); Henneford v. Silas Mason, note 6 supra, at 581. 
10 Maryland Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 81, §375, makes the vendor personally 
liable for failure to collect. Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §423.12 makes the tax a debt owed 
by the retailer to the state, and calls for the revocation of a foreign corporation's permit to 
do business for failure to pay. 
11 International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 at 441, 
64 S.Ct. 1060 (1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, 
dissenting opinion at pp. 60, 61. 
12 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., note 7 supra, at 330; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White 
Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, at 49. 
1a 57 HARv. L. REv. 1086 (1944). 
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cisions the Court has said that a state may impose a sales tax where there is 
delivery within the taxing state in conjunction with substantial local activity,14 
but may not where there is nothing more than solicitation and delivery,15 
although it may impose a use tax on the vendor in the latter situation.16 It 
has stated that a use tax may be imposed on strictly interstate sales if the 
vendor also does a related intrastate business,17 but that an occupation tax 
on the privilege of engaging in retail sales may not be assessed under the same 
circumstances.18 The opinion in the principal case was a victory for Justice 
Jackson, climaxing a ten year fight begun with his dissent in General Trading 
Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, 19 in which the Court held that a use tax may 
be enforced against a vendor who merely solicits orders within the taxing 
state. It brings some order into one area of this problem by limiting the 
power of a state to tax an out-state vendor by calling a tax really based on 
a sale transaction a use tax. 
· It would seem that a true use tax applied to and collected from the con-
sumer is, and should be, perfectly valid. To make a foreign corporation a 
collecting agent for the state when it maintains a local retail store,20 or a 
sales office,21 or carries on "solicitation plus"22 within the taxing state may 
also be valid, but a tax on a strictly interstate sale should have some stronger 
constitutional justification than the power to coerce compliance. The fact that 
a state can force a vendor to pay a tax on his interstate activity by threatening 
to revoke a local privilege should not be an argument in favor of the validity 
of the tax itself. An attempt, as in the principal case, to place tax liability on 
a foreign corporation whose only activity in the taxing state is the delivery of 
goods sold by it outside the state is clearly beyond the scope of permissible state 
taxing power. It is gratifying that the Court drew this line to stop an arbitrary 
extension of a state's sovereignty. In the light of the realistic approach of the 
principal case, an approach by which a use tax levied on the vendor is equated 
with a sales tax, it will now be in order for the Court to re-evaluate some of its 
14 McGolclrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., note 7 supra, at 49, " ••• transfer 
of possession to the purchaser within the state, which is the taxable event regardless of the 
time and place of passing title •.• ," and at 58, "Here the tax is conditioned upon a local 
activity, delivery of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption." 
15 McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., note 7 supra. 
16 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, 322 U.S. 335, 64 S.Ct. 1028 
(1944). Cf. Reichman-Crosby Co. v. Stone, 204 Miss. 122, 37 S. (2d) 22 (1948). 
17Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 at 364, 61 S.Ct. 586 (1941); 
Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 61 S.Ct. 593 (1941). 
18 Norton Co. v. Dept. of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 at 539, 71 S.Ct. 377 
(1951). 
19 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, note 16 supra. 
20 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., note 17 supra. 
21 Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 59 S.Ct. 376 (1939); Mona-
motor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 54 S.Ct. 575 (1934); McGolclrick v. Felt & 
Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70, 60 S.Ct. 404 (1940). 
22 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). 
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earlier decisions in this field. As Justice Jackson said ten years ago, a state should 
have no "power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no power to tax.''23 
John Leddy, S.Ed. 
23 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner, note 16 supra, at 339. 
